Bank credit rationing in cameroonian's SMES
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.59051/joaf.v6i1.41Keywords:
Informational opacity, Risk substitution, Relationship, Guarantee, RationingAbstract
This study aims firstly to high light the characteristics of the information asymmetry and bank credit rationing, secondly, to analyze the factors explaining the rationing of bank credit.
The survey study of 93 SMEs shows that they operate in a context of asymmetric information and they are also rationed. The logistic regression tests show that the opaque nature of SMEs and the uncertainty of investment project positively influence the behavior of bank credit rationing and the bank long-term relationship between the bank and the company, and the ability to provide guarantee shave a negative impact on the behavior of bank credit rationing.
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Published
2015-12-30
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How to Cite
Bank credit rationing in cameroonian’s SMES. (2015). Journal of Academic Finance, 6(1). https://doi.org/10.59051/joaf.v6i1.41
