Incentive fees at the heart of a reflection on the quality of auditing in French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.59051/joaf.v8i1.89Abstract
The vulnerability of auditors with respect to the managers is an issue which currently makes headlines in sub-Saharan Africa and more particularly in Cameroon. It is with this in mind that this study seeks to verify if the quality of auditing in this region of planet is not imputable to the lack of incentives related to fees. Using classification and econometric analyses through the application of a logistic regression on data collected by questionnaire on 40 auditing firms in Cameroon, we find that the quality of auditing can be explained by the incentive fees. More specifically, this study shows that the probability of having a quality audit is higher when the auditing fees is increased and lower if they are reduced.
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Copyright (c) 2017 Alain Gilles FOKA TAGNE, Joseph NDASSI YEPGNOU, David KAMDEM
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