La Protection des investisseurs minoritaires et pratiques de gouvernement d'entreprise

données probantes de la Bourse régionale de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BRVM)

  • Babarinde rene ADEROMOU associated with the corporate finance and economic financing laboratory, UCAD, Senegal.
  • Mahmoudou Bocar SALL UCAD Senegal.

Résumé

Les pays en développement ont généralement des structures institutionnelles et des environnements contractuels faibles. Plus précisément, la concentration de l’actionnariat serait une réponse à la faible protection des investisseurs (Klapper& Love, 2004; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, &Vishny, 2000). Cependant, en Inde, malgré l'amélioration du degré de protection des investisseurs, l'actionnariat reste concentré (Altaf& Shah, 2018). Cela signifie que la concentration de l'actionnariat n'est pas toujours dictée par le niveau de protection des investisseurs. L'objectif de cet article est de déterminer l'effet de la protection des investisseurs minoritaires sur les pratiques de gouvernement d'entreprise adoptées par les multinationales cotées sur la BRVM. Nous avons utilisé l'estimateur dynamique sur données de panel pour obtenir des résultats significatifs. Les résultats montrent que lorsque la protection des investisseurs minoritaires s'améliore, les fonctions de gérant et de président du conseil d'administration tendent à se séparer; la gouvernance d'entreprise tend vers un modèle de type bicaméral, l'actionnariat a tendance à être moins concentré, des politiques et des normes de rémunération sont mises en place et la rémunération du président et des membres du conseil d'administration publiée dans les rapports annuels et les pratiques RSE et le respect au code d'éthique et de normes ont tendance à être une réalité. Les résultats de cette étude plaident pour des politiques consistant à améliorer le niveau de protection des investisseurs, notamment le niveau de protection des investisseurs minoritaires.

Biographie de l'auteur

Mahmoudou Bocar SALL, UCAD Senegal.

[1]Associate Professor, Director of corporate finance and economic financing laboratory, UCAD Senegal.

Références

Afego, P. N. (2015). Market efficiency in developing African stock markets: What do we know? The Journal of Developing Areas, 49(1), 243–266.
Aguilera, R. V., Judge, W. Q., & Terjesen, S. A. (2016). Corporate Governance Deviance. Academy of Management Review, 43(1), 87‑109.
Albu, O. B., & Flyverbom, M. (2019). Organizational Transparency: Conceptualizations, Conditions, and Consequences. Business & Society, 58(2), 268‑297.
Altaf, N., & Shah, F. A. (2018). Ownership concentration and firm performance in Indian firms: Does investor protection quality matter? Journal of Indian Business Research, 10(1), 33‑52.
An, H., Chen, Y., Luo, D., & Zhang, T. (2016). Political uncertainty and corporate investment: Evidence from China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 36, 174‑189.
Anderson, T. W., & Hsiao, C. (1982). Formulation and estimation of dynamic models using panel data. Journal of econometrics, 18(1), 47–82.
Aragon, G. O., Nanda, V. K., & Zhao, H. (2019). Investor Protection and Capital Fragility: Evidence from Hedge Funds Around the World (SSRN Scholarly Paper No ID 3207064).
Bayala, B. S. A. (2012). Going public and characteristics of newly listed companies: Evidence from the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières (BRVM). African Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 1(4), 383–403.
Bazdresch, S., Kahn, R. J., & Whited, T. M. (2018). Estimating and Testing Dynamic Corporate Finance Models. The Review of Financial Studies, 31(1), 322‑361.
Bell, R. G., Filatotchev, I., & Aguilera, R. V. (2014). Corporate Governance and Investors’ Perceptions of Foreign IPO Value: An Institutional Perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 57(1), 301‑320.
BerglöF, E., & Pajuste, A. (2005). What do Firms Disclose and Why? Enforcing Corporate Governance and Transparency in Central and Eastern Europe. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 21(2), 178‑197.
Black, B. S., Jang, H., & Kim, W. (2006). Does corporate governance predict firms’ market values? Evidence from Korea. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 22(2), 366–413.
Blundell, R., & Smith, R. J. (1990). Conditions initiales et estimation efficace dans les modèles dynamiques sur données de panel: Une application au comportement d’investissement des entreprises. Annales d’Économie et de Statistique, (20/21), 109‑123.
Boubakri, N., Cosset, J.-C., & Guedhami, O. (2005). Postprivatization corporate governance: The role of ownership structure and investor protection. Journal of Financial Economics, 76(2), 369–399.
Bozzi, S., Barontini, R., & Miroshnychenko, I. (2017). Investor protection and CEO compensation in family firms. Corporate Ownership and Control, 14(2), 17–29.
Breuer, W., Müller, T., Rosenbach, D., & Salzmann, A. (2018). Corporate social responsibility, investor protection, and cost of equity: A cross-country comparison. Journal of Banking & Finance, 96, 34‑55.
Brueckner, M. (2017). Rent extraction by capitalists. European Journal of Political Economy, 50, 157‑170.
Bruno, G. S. (2005a). Estimation and inference in dynamic unbalanced panel data models with a small number of individuals. Università commerciale Luigi Bocconi.
Bruno, G. S. (2005b). XTLSDVC: Stata module to estimate bias corrected LSDV dynamic panel data models.
Bun, M. J., & Kiviet, J. F. (2001). The accuracy of inference in small samples of dynamic panel data models. Tinbergen Institute discussion paper.
Burkart, M., Gromb, D., Mueller, H. M., & Panunzi, F. (2014). Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers: Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers. The Journal of Finance, 69(3), 1129‑1165.
Bushman, R. M., Piotroski, J. D., & Smith, A. J. (2004). What determines corporate transparency? Journal of accounting research, 42(2), 207–252.
Calza, F., Profumo, G., & Tutore, I. (2017). Boards of directors and firms’ environmental proactivity. Corporate Governance and Organizational Behavior Review, 1(1), 52–64.
Chang, K., Lee, J., & Shim, H. (2019). CEO Duality and Firm Performance: Does Economic Policy Uncertainty Mediate the Relation? International Review of Finance.
Chih, H.-L., Shen, C.-H., & Kang, F.-C. (2008). Corporate social responsibility, investor protection, and earnings management: Some international evidence. Journal of business ethics, 79(1‑2), 179–198.
Christensen, L. T. (2002). Corporate communication: The challenge of transparency. Corporate Communications: An International Journal. https://doi.org/10.1108/13563280210436772
Clarke, R. C. (1986). Corporate law. Boston, Little, Brown and Company.
Clarkson, P., Bueren, A. L. V., & Walker, J. (2006). Chief executive officer remuneration disclosure quality: Corporate responses to an evolving disclosure environment. Accounting & Finance, 46(5), 771‑796.
Dang, V. A., Kim, M., & Shin, Y. (2015). In search of robust methods for dynamic panel data models in empirical corporate finance. Journal of Banking & Finance, 53, 84–98.
Davis, J., Batchelor, J. H., & Kreiser, P. (2019). The influence of organizational task environment and firm size on top-executive compensation contracts. Journal of Small Business & Entrepreneurship, 31(1), 21‑42.
Defond, M. L., & Hung, M. (2004). Investor protection and corporate governance: Evidence from worldwide CEO turnover. Journal of Accounting Research, 42(2), 269–312.
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Maksimovic, V. (1998). Law, finance, and firm growth. The Journal of Finance, 53(6), 2107–2137.
Filatotchev, I., Bell, R. G., & Moore, C. (2012). Strategic and Institutional Effects on Foreign IPO Performance: Examining the Impact of Country of Origin, Corporate Governance, and Host Country Effects.
Filatotchev, I., & Nakajima, C. (2010). Internal and External Corporate Governance : An Interface between an Organization and its Environment. British Journal of Management, 21(3), 591‑606.
Filatotchev, I., Poulsen, A., & Bell, R. G. (2018). Corporate governance of a multinational enterprise: Firm, industry and institutional perspectives. Journal of Corporate Finance.
Flannery, M. J., & Hankins, K. W. (2013). Estimating dynamic panel models in corporate finance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 19, 1–19.
Franck, T. M. (1995). Fairness in International Law and Institutions. Oxford University Press UK.
Garcia-Sanchez, I. M., Aceituno, J. V. F., & Domínguez, L. R. (2015). The ethical commitment of independent directors in different contexts of investor protection. BRQ Business Research Quarterly, 18(2), 81–94.
García‐Sánchez, I.-M., Martínez‐Ferrero, J., & García‐Meca, E. (2018). Board of Directors and CSR in Banking: The Moderating Role of Bank Regulation and Investor Protection Strength. Australian Accounting Review, 28(3), 428‑445.
Greenwood, R., Raynard, M., Kodeih, F., Micelotta, E. R., & Lounsbury, M. (2011). Institutional complexity and organizational responses. Academy of Management annals, 5(1), 317–371.
Hicks, J. W. (1994). Protection of Individual Investors under U.S. Securities Laws: The Impact of International Regulatory Competition. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 1(2), 431‑465.
Hill, P., Korczak, A., & Korczak, P. (2019). Political uncertainty exposure of individual companies: The case of the Brexit referendum. Journal of Banking & Finance, 100, 58–76.
Hillman, A. J., Cannella, A. A., & Paetzold, R. L. (2000). The resource dependence role of corporate directors : Strategic adaptation of board composition in response to environmental change. Journal of Management studies, 37(2), 235–256.
Himmelberg, C. P., Hubbard, R. G., & Love, I. (2002). Investment, protection, ownership, and the cost of capital. Consulté à l’adresse Working Paper Research website: https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/144239
Ingram, P., & Silverman, B. S. (2002). New Institutionalism in Strategic Management, The. Advances in Strategic Management. Emerald Group Publishing.
Julio, B., & Yook, Y. (2012). Political uncertainty and corporate investment cycles. The Journal of Finance, 67(1), 45–83.
Klapper, L. F., & Love, I. (2004). Corporate governance, investor protection, and performance in emerging markets. Journal of corporate Finance, 10(5), 703–728.
Kohler, E. L. (1940). Protection for Investors. The Accounting Review, 15(3), 446‑452.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. The journal of finance, 54(2), 471–517.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000). Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of financial economics, 58(1), 3–27.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). Legal determinants of external finance. The journal of finance, 52(3), 1131–1150.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and finance. Journal of political economy, 106(6), 1113–1155.
Lepore, L., Paolone, F., & Cambrea, D. R. (2018). Ownership structure, investors’ protection and corporate valuation: The effect of judicial system efficiency in family and non-family firms. Journal of Management and Governance, 1‑34.
Madhani, P. M. (2016). Ownership Concentration, Corporate Governance and Disclosure Practices: A Study of Firms Listed in Bombay Stock Exchange. Corporate Governance and Disclosure Practices: A Study of Firms Listed in Bombay Stock Exchange, 7–36.
Miller, G. S. (2004). Discussion of What Determines Corporate Transparency? Journal of Accounting Research, 42(2), 253‑268.
Nguyen, T., Locke, S., & Reddy, K. (2015). Ownership concentration and corporate performance from a dynamic perspective: Does national governance quality matter? International Review of Financial Analysis, 41, 148–161.
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Consulté à l’adresse https://books.google.fr/books?hl=fr&lr=&id=oFnWbTqgNPYC&oi=fnd&pg=PR6&dq=North+1990&ots=sZhrSgKqUa&sig=wA09Jge9Wl5dV-bewHINa8vkaHU
O’Connor, T., Kinsella, S., & O’Sullivan, V. (2014). Legal protection of investors, corporate governance, and investable premia in emerging markets. International Review of Economics & Finance, 29, 426–439.
OECD. (2019a). OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2019. Consulté à l’adresse www.oecd.org/corporate/corporate-governance-factbook.htm
OECD. (2019b). OECD Survey of Corporate Governance Frameworks in the Middle East and North Africa. Consulté à l’adresse http://www.oecd.org/corporate/OECD-Survey-of-Corporate- Governance-Frameworks-in-MENA.htm
Okeahalam, C. C., & Akinboade, O. A. (2003). A review of corporate governance in Africa: Literature, issues and challenges. global corporate governance forum, 15, 1–34.
Parris, D. L., Dapko, J. L., Arnold, R. W., & Arnold, D. (2016). Exploring transparency: A new framework for responsible business management. Management Decision. https://doi.org/10.1108/MD-07-2015-0279
Pearce, J. A., & Zahra, S. A. (1992). Board composition from a strategic contingency perspective. Journal of management studies, 29(4), 411–438.
Persakis, A., & Iatridis, G. E. (2016). Audit quality, investor protection and earnings management during the financial crisis of 2008: An international perspective. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 41, 73‑101.
Pfeffer, J. (1972). Size and composition of corporate boards of directors : The organization and its environment. Administrative science quarterly, 218–228.
Saona, P., & San Martín, P. (2016). Country level governance variables and ownership concentration as determinants of firm value in Latin America. International Review of Law and Economics, 47, 84–95.
Sen, K., & Te Velde, D. W. (2009). State business relations and economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of Development Studies, 45(8), 1267–1283.
Schnackenberg, A. K., & Tomlinson, E. C. (2016). Organizational transparency: A new perspective on managing trust in organization-stakeholder relationships. Journal of Management, 42(7), 1784–1810.
Scott, W. R. (1987). The adolescence of institutional theory. Administrative science quarterly, 493–511.
Shen, C.-H., & Chih, H.-L. (2005). Investor protection, prospect theory, and earnings management: An international comparison of the banking industry. Journal of Banking & Finance, 29(10), 2675–2697.
Tirole, J. (2001, janvier). Corporate Governance. Econometrics, Vol. 69, No. 1., p. 1‑35.
Weaver, G. R., TreviÑo, L. K., & Cochran, P. L. (1999). Corporate Ethics Programs as Control Systems : Influences of Executive Commitment and Environmental Factors. Academy of Management Journal, 42(1), 41‑57.
Wintoki, M. B., Linck, J. S., & Netter, J. M. (2012). Endogeneity and the dynamics of internal corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 105(3), 581‑606.
Yutao, H. Y. W. (2010). Investor Protection and Ownership Concentration: New Empirical Evidence from Control Right Transfer [J]. Journal of Financial Research, 3.
Zhou, J., & Lan, W. (2017). Investor protection and cross-border acquisitions by Chinese listed firms: The moderating role of institutional shareholders. International Review of Economics & Finance.
Zoogah, D. B., Peng, M. W., & Woldu, H. (2014). Institutions, Resources, and Organizational Effectiveness in Africa. Academy of Management Perspectives, 29(1), 7‑31.
Publiée
2019-12-30
Comment citer
ADEROMOU, B. rene, & SALL, M. B. (2019). La Protection des investisseurs minoritaires et pratiques de gouvernement d’entreprise. Journal of Academic Finance, 10(2), 102-117. Consulté à l’adresse https://www.scientific-society.com/journal/index.php/AF/article/view/344
Rubrique
Articles