Board Characteristics and Firm Performance in State-Owned Enterprises
Evidence from Cameroon
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.59051/joaf.v15i2.837Keywords:
Board of Directors, Performance, Public Companies, Turnover, Stakeholders, State-Owned EnterprisesAbstract
Purpose: This study examines the link or association between the characteristics of boards of directors and performance in public enterprises in Cameroon.
Method: Generalized least square regression (GLS) techniques were used in conjunction with generalized estimation equations (GEIs). The data used in this study are taken from the database of the Technical Commission for Rehabilitation (CTR) of public sector companies, which is hosted by the Ministry of Finance (MINFI).
Results: the proportion of women directors has a positive and significant influence on the performance of public enterprises. The number of meetings held by the board is significantly and positively associated with the performance of public enterprises. Moreover, the proportion of foreigners has no association with the performance of public enterprises.
Originality / relevance: this article is initiated in favor of the promulgation by the Head of State of Cameroon of laws No 2017/010 and 2017/011 of 12 July 2017 on the general status of public enterprises preceded by decree No 2019/320 of 19 June 2019 specifying the modalities for the application of laws raised, all this in place of the 1999 law. In view of the changing socio-economic environment, it became urgent to review this old law in order to adapt the management of these entities with the new realities of New Public Management. These companies are performing against and are generally under the perfusion of the state. Revisiting the normative framework and questioning the effectiveness of the implementing decree are elements that have guided this research program which includes other axes.
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