Political connection and financing of Tunisian companies
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.59051/joaf.v8i1.94Abstract
The aim of this article is to study the effect of political connections on debt access of Tunisian firms. The study is carried out on a simple of 32 Tunisian firms on the period 2007-2012. Obtained results show that Tunisian politically connected firms have a preferential access to short term debt. This relationship has been confirmed only on pre revolution.
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References
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Beck, T., Demirguç-Kunt, A., Levine, R., 2006. Bank supervision and corruption in lending. Journal of monetary economics, 53, 31-63.
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Frank, M., Goyal, V., 2009. Capital structure decisions: which factors are reliably important? Financial Management, 38, 1-37.
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Kennedy, P., (1998). A guide to econometrics. Blackwell, Oxford.
Khawaja, A.I., Mian, A., 2005. Do lender favor politically connected firm? Rent-seeking in an emerging financial market. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120, 371-411.
Kremp, E., Stross, E., 2001. L’endettement des entreprises industrielles françaises et allemandes : des évolutions distinctes malgré des déterminants proches. Economie et statistique, Volume 341, N°1, 153-171.
La Porta, R., Lopez de Silanes, F., Shleifer, 2002. Investor protection and corporate valuation. Journal of Finance.
Norden, L., Kampen, S.V., 2013. Corporate leverage and the collateral channel. Journal of Banking and Finance, Volume 37, 5062-5072.
Rajan, R.G., Zingales, L., 1995. What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence from international data. Journal of Finance, 50, 1421-1460.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, 1992. Liquidation value and debt capacity: a market equilibrium approach. Journal of Finance, 47, 1343-1366.
Titman, S., Wessels, R., 1988. The determinants of capital structure choice. Journal of Finance, 43, 1-19.
Beck, T., Demirguç-Kunt, A., Levine, R., 2006. Bank supervision and corruption in lending. Journal of monetary economics, 53, 31-63.
Benmelech, E., Bergman, N., 2009. Collateral pricing. Journal of Financial Economics.
Bessler, W., Drobetz, W., Gruninger, M., 2011. Information asymmetry and financing decisions. International Review of Finance.
Bliss, M.A., Gul, F.A., 2012. Political connected and cost of debt: some Malaysian evidence, Journal of banking and Finance, 36, 1520-1527.
Booth, L., Airasian V., Demirguç-Kunt, A., Maksimovik, V., 2001. Capital structure in developing countries. Journal of Finance, 56, 87-130.
Boubakri, N., Guedhami, O., Michra, D., 2008. Political connections and the cost of equity capital. Journal of corporate Finance, 18, 541-559.
Dinç, S.I., 2005. Politicians and banks: political influence on government-owned banks in emerging countries. Journal of financial economics, 77. 53-79.
Ebrahim, M.S., Girma, S., Shah, M.E., Williams, J., 2014. Dynamic capital structure and political patronage: the case of Malaysia. International Review of Financial Analysis, 31, 117-128.
Faccio, M., 2006. Politically connected firm. American Economic Review 96, 69-86.
Faccio, M., 2010. Difference between politically connected and non-connected firms: a cross country analysis. Financial Management, 39, 5-27.
Fama, E.F., French, K.R., 2002. The equity premium. The Journal of Finance, 57 (2) 637-659.
Frank, M., Goyal, V., 2009. Capital structure decisions: which factors are reliably important? Financial Management, 38, 1-37.
Harris, M., Raviv, A., 1991. The theory of capital structure. The Journal of Finance, 46 (1), 297-355.
Houston, J.F., Jiang, L., Lin, C., May, Y., 2014. Political connections and the cost of bank loans. Journal of Accounting Research, 52, 193-243.
Huang, G., Song, F., 2006. The determinants of capital structure: evidence from china, volume17, Issue 1, 14-36.
Kang, J.K., Zhang, L., 2012. From backroom to boardroom: role of government directors in U.S. public firms and their impact on performance. Available at SSRN.
Kennedy, P., (1998). A guide to econometrics. Blackwell, Oxford.
Khawaja, A.I., Mian, A., 2005. Do lender favor politically connected firm? Rent-seeking in an emerging financial market. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120, 371-411.
Kremp, E., Stross, E., 2001. L’endettement des entreprises industrielles françaises et allemandes : des évolutions distinctes malgré des déterminants proches. Economie et statistique, Volume 341, N°1, 153-171.
La Porta, R., Lopez de Silanes, F., Shleifer, 2002. Investor protection and corporate valuation. Journal of Finance.
Norden, L., Kampen, S.V., 2013. Corporate leverage and the collateral channel. Journal of Banking and Finance, Volume 37, 5062-5072.
Rajan, R.G., Zingales, L., 1995. What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence from international data. Journal of Finance, 50, 1421-1460.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, 1992. Liquidation value and debt capacity: a market equilibrium approach. Journal of Finance, 47, 1343-1366.
Titman, S., Wessels, R., 1988. The determinants of capital structure choice. Journal of Finance, 43, 1-19.
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Published
2017-06-21
How to Cite
BENCHEIKH, F., & BOULILA TAKTAK, N. (2017). Political connection and financing of Tunisian companies. Journal of Academic Finance, 8(1). https://doi.org/10.59051/joaf.v8i1.94
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Copyright (c) 2017 Fayrouz BENCHEIKH, Neila BOULILA TAKTAK
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